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Abstract. Computational sociology models social phenomena using the 
concepts of emergence and downward causation. But the theoretical status of 
these concepts is ambiguous; they suppose too much ontology and are invoked 
by two opposed sociological stands, namely, individualistic and holistic 
interpretations of social phenomena. In this paper, we propose a theoretical 
alternative that not only might clarify those concepts, but also keep their 
heuristic and interpretative value for computational sociology. We do so by 
advancing two proposals. Firstly, we suggest a non-ontological framework that 
allows modellers to identify emergent processes. This framework asserts the 
macro level and micro level as the emergent by-products of an instrumental 
prompting (the very modellers’ act of distinguishing). Secondly, in order to 
support analytically the modellers’ simulations, we link this non-ontological 
framework with the theory of self-referential social systems. This theory gives 
an account of the emergence of the social realm from the bottom-up as 
communication and describes the process by which society limits the possible 
selections of individuals. These two proposals are well-positioned to overcome 
some epistemological drawbacks, although they also generate new challenges to 
computational sociology. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Over the past forty years, a new kind of method has increasingly been used in the social 
sciences: that of the computer simulation of social processes. Social simulation (or 
computational social science) is an outstanding method for modelling and building 
explanations of social processes, based on ideas about the emergence of complex behaviour 
from relatively simple activities. With this technique we can study properties of emergent 
orders that arise from local interactions among a multitude of independent components. 
And we can understand the ways in which such emergent orders can influence or constrain 
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the individual actions of those components. This process is known as ‘self-organization’ 
and is characterised by the concepts of ‘bottom-up’ and ‘downward causation’. These 
concepts are closely related to the scientific and philosophical idea of ‘emergence’, a core 
idea in sociology and computational social science. For this reason, it is not surprising that 
computer simulation can make a difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ social science for 
some thinkers (Moss & Edmonds, 2005). 
 
 However, despite its possibilities (such as an empirical and normative understanding 
of dynamic systems, heuristic research and methodological advancement (Axelrod, 1997)), 
which exceed the limits of traditional methods in sociology, computer simulation in the 
social sciences also has some epistemological and methodological drawbacks. First, there is 
no agreement in the social simulation community about the idea of ‘emergence’ and its 
value for theory and explanation. Second, as a consequence, the community of 
simulationists is divided between ‘individualist’ and ‘collectivist’ emergentists. Finally, 
most research using computer simulation ignores the importance of symbolic 
communication in the social realm, even though only this process can be called social in its 
own right. Because social communication is not an important issue within the mainstream 
of computational sociology, it is not hard to understand the reason why the most important 
advances in computational models about the emergence and the evolution of language are 
made outside sociology (e.g., Perfors, 2002). 
 
 In order to analyse how these drawbacks can be overcome, in section II we begin by 
examining the notion of emergence in a selected group of theories in order to show the 
ambiguity of the concept and draw some relations between that notion and the different 
positions in computational sociology (section III). Then, we describe the over-ontological 
sense of emergence (section IV) and show a possible epistemological alternative in order to 
identify the logical conditions by which we can distinguish a simulation as describing 
‘emergent’ features (section V). We relate this epistemological alternative to the distinction 
between individual and communication as advanced by the Niklas Luhmann’s theory of 
self-referential social systems, because, we hold, this theoretical framework is well-
positioned to be a sociological support for developing social simulations (section VI). We 
present that theory and conclude with some analytical consequences for computational 
sociology (section VII). 
 
 
II. The two souls inhabiting emergence 
 
In all the discussions about emergent phenomena there are two constraints (Schröder, 
1998). First, emergent properties are always the properties of complex systems. So, 
elementary particles do not have emergent properties. Second, a property of a complex 
thing, in order to be emergent, must not be a property of a proper part of that thing. Thus, 
properties like mass, velocity and charge are not emergent properties. These two 
restrictions are uncontroversial, because they say nothing about the possible relations 
between the parts of a thing and its emergent properties except, obviously, that they must 
be at different levels. The quarrels arise when we try to define that relationship by 
answering two questions: (a) if we accept there are elementary properties, can there be 
authentic emergent properties endowed with causal power? (b), if we can recognise the 
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micro and macro levels as independent, can the properties of the parts explain the emergent 
properties? As we will see, these related ontological and epistemological topics are the 
focus of several debates. 
 
 In its strong sense, the concept of emergence means that nature (and society) 
articulates itself on different levels of organisation, and that each of these levels yields its 
own novel causal powers. These kinds of global organisations are called emergent because 
they cannot be reduced to the sum of the properties of their elements (Hulswit, 2005). In 
this way, for instance, consciousness is not deducible (therefore, it might be said, is not 
explainable) from neuronal properties alone and, similarly, society is not reducible to 
individual properties alone. In a more general way, no higher level is explainable from its 
constituent units. Here, the motto is: ‘the whole is more than the sum of its components’. In 
order to explain that ‘more than’, the ontological statement about the existence of emergent 
properties is frequently followed by a kind of epistemological statement that asserts the 
non-reducibility of emergent (or macro) properties from properties of the parts in isolation. 
 
 This strong concept of emergence is often formulated in heavily metaphysical 
terms. As Bitbol (2007) suggests, those who defend the concept of emergence want to 
know whether there truly exists such emergent large-scale properties and whether these 
large scale properties are more than just epiphenomena; accordingly, they want to know 
whether they have or do not have the causal power of altering other (large-scale or micro-
scale) properties. For this reason, in many works both emergent properties and causal 
power are used more or less interchangeably (in the critical realist literature, the two terms 
may be used more or less interchangeably, e.g., Elder-Vass, 2005). 
 
 This metaphysical formulation of emergence is not surprising considering its 
historical origins. Alexander, Morgan and Broad, the classical emergentists1, invented and 
developed the concept during the early twentieth century in order to find a satisfactory 
compromise between two extreme ontologies; identity theories (or reductionist 
materialism) and dualism. The first of these two ontologies is monist and materialist: it says 
that there exists, in the world, nothing else other than material elements and their 
properties. The second ontology is dualist: it says that there are two substances or two 
realms of being: mind and matter, or life and inanimate matter. Classical emergentists tried 
to develop a middle position between these two ontologies. Since then “[e]mergence has 
been perceived as a third path between dualism and identity theory, and this third path is 
generally known as nonreductive materialism.” (Sawyer, 2002, p. 554). But being a middle 
path does not preclude showing a little bend towards one or the other of the two extremes. 
 
Emergentism comes very close to monist materialism if it takes the high level behavior 
as a superficial symptom, with no relevance whatsoever to the real physical processes 
taking place at the low level (this is the “supervenience” view). Conversely, 
emergentism comes closer to dualism when it tries to endow the emergent properties 
with some sort ontological consistence, and with causal powers of their own. (Bitbol, 
2007, p. 294) 
                                                 
1
 Classical emergentism, also known as “British Emergentism”, is the school of thought represented by these 
thinkers of the early 20th century, who argued that emergent properties are not deducible and explainable in 
terms of properties of the lower elements.  
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 These differences, related to the ontological and epistemological status of 
emergence, have been reinterpreted in sociology to link them with the longstanding debate 
over methodological individualism and methodological collectivism. The debate is based 
on the answer that social theorists make to the question: Where must social theory aim its 
attention in order to construct explanations about the social realm? There are two possible 
answers, namely, ‘individual entities’ (actors, individual action, desires, beliefs, etc.) or 
‘collectives entities’ (institutions, norms, structures). This debate has been at the heart of 
social theory from its origins. For example, Emile Durkheim argued that social properties 
have causal force on the individual. His defining criterion of the social fact was its external 
constraint on the individual and, consequently, his methodological recommendation was 
that sociologists must consider the nature of society, not the nature of individuals 
(Durkheim, 1982, p. 63). However, some classical thinkers put forward the opposing claim. 
Max Weber proposed that social phenomena must be explained by showing how they result 
from individual actions, which in turn must be explained by reference to the intentional 
states that motivate the individual actors (Weber, 1978). 
 
 The concept of emergence was reinterpreted and handled according to this long-
lasting division inside sociological theory, concerned with the relationship between agency 
and structure, individual and society, and micro and macro. Consequently, existing 
sociological uses of emergence are contradictory and unstable. On the one hand, many 
accounts of the micro-to-macro link use the philosophical concept of emergence to argue 
that social phenomena are brought about by individuals in action (Coleman, 1990; Elster, 
1989). On the other hand, emergence has been invoked by methodological collectivists to 
indicate that, although only individuals exist, collectives possess emergent properties that 
cannot be reduced to individual ones (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1982; Luhmann, 1996a). 
Sawyer talks about a ‘slippery concept of emergence’ in sociology and argues that “two 
opposed sociological paradigms both invoke the concept of emergence and draw opposed 
conclusions. The problem arises in part because sociologists have not developed an 
adequate account of emergence” (Sawyer, 2002, p. 552).  
 
 
III. Emergence within computational sociology 
 
In this context, what happens with computational sociology? As we will explain, the uses 
of emergence in computational sociology are ambiguous and unstable as well. Although the 
concept has become widely used within the social simulation community, it continues “to 
be vaguely defined and to stand in for different propositions about social generative 
mechanisms.” (Goldspink & Kay, 2007, p. 1).  
 
 For Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005), computer simulation is an excellent technique for 
modelling and understanding social processes, based on ideas about the emergence of 
complex behaviour from relatively simple activities. Gilbert argues that “[w]e can say that a 
phenomenon is emergent when it can only be described and characterised using terms and 
measurements that are inappropriate or impossible to apply to the component units” 
(Gilbert, 2004, p. 3). Quoting Maturana and Varela’s  (1992) autopoietic theory, Gilbert 
and Troitzsch indicate that “the emphasis on processes and on relations between 
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components, both of which can be examined by means of simulation, accounts for the 
developing link between this theoretical perspective and simulation research” (Gilbert & 
Troitzsch, 2005, p. 12). In that sense, computational sociology provides the possibility of 
using experimental methods in order to model emergent social phenomena, or at least their 
computer representations; the possibility of directly studying the emergence of social 
institutions from individual interaction; and of using computer coding as a way of 
formalising dynamic social theories (Gilbert, 2004). Hence for these thinkers, there is a 
strong link between the theoretical concept of emergence and computer modelling.  
 
 The use of autopoietic theory in both computational sociology and social theory is 
hardly surprising. After all, Maturana and Varela always related autopoiesis with ‘emergent 
properties’ (Maturana & Varela, 1979, 1992; Varela, 1988) and developed a computational 
representation about their model of life by using cellular automata modelling (Varela, 
Maturana, & Uribe, 1974). In computational sociology, some theorists argue in favour of 
autopoiesis as a valid, useful and complete framework to understand social systems. Thus 
for instance Goldspink and Kay: 
 
Complex systems, artificial life and artificial societies currently model bottom up 
emergence and systems where top down influence operates only indirectly by 
downward propagation of constraint, not by more direct feedback. We have argued that 
this is not adequate for an understanding of human social systems. We have set out two 
mechanisms present in human social systems – non-reflexive and reflexive; suggested 
a suitable theoretical frame from which they may be considered – that of autopoiesis. 
(Goldspink & Kay, 2007, p. 7) 
 
 Nevertheless, not everyone in computational sociology shares this opinion about the 
concept of emergence and its value as a theoretical support for computer modelling. 
Epstein, another leader in the field of simulation, seems to look at it with suspicion. He 
doubts its practical usefulness: “I have always been uncomfortable with the vagueness and 
occasional mysticism surrounding this word” (Epstein, 2007, p. 31). For him, the problem 
with emergentism resides in emergent phenomena being unexplainable in principle, 
because (emergentists argue) the parts cannot explain the whole. But Epstein indicates that 
 
Obviously, “wholes” may have attributes or capabilities that their constituent parts 
cannot have (e.g., “whole” conscious people can have happy memories of childhood 
while, presumably, individual neurons cannot). Equally obvious, the parts have to be 
hooked up right –or interact in specific, and perhaps complicated, ways– for the whole 
to exhibit those attributes. We at present may be able to explain why these specific 
relationships among parts eventuate in the stated attributes of wholes, and we may not. 
But, unlike classical emergentists, we do not preclude such explanation in principle. 
(Epstein, 2007, p. 36; italics in original) 
 
 Epstein puts forward the idea that it “is precisely the generative sufficiency of the 
parts (the microspecifaction) that constitutes the whole’s explanation!” (Epstein, 2007, p. 
36)2. This claim goes against emergentism (or, at least, it goes against classical 
                                                 
2
 “Typical of classical emergentism would be the claim: No description of the individual bee can ever explain 
the emergent phenomenon of the hive. How would one know that? Is it a falsifiable empirical claim, or 
something that seems true because of a lax definition of terms? Perhaps the latter. The mischievous piece of 
the formulation is the phrase “description of the individual bee”. What is that? Does “the bee’s” description 
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emergentism). For Epstein agent-based modelling is reductionist par excellence. By 
attempting to generate social phenomena on computers or in mathematical models, “we are 
denying that they are unexplainable or undeducible in principle – we’re trying to explain 
them precisely by figuring out microrules that will generate them.” (Epstein, 2007, p. 36). 
In a similar ‘individualistic’ way, Hedström talks about the importance of constructing 
mechanism-based explanations, which implies describing how the social and the individual 
influence each other over time. Such explanations pay close attention to how actors in 
interaction with one another bring about social phenomena. For this sociologist, “[s]ocial 
phenomena, as here defined, refer to properties of groups of individuals (…) These social 
phenomena are the result of individuals’ actions, but they also causally influence 
individuals’ actions” (Hedström, 2005, p. 70). Consequently, computational sociology 
(specifically, agent-based analysis) is a “formalism designed for analyzing the relationship 
between individual-level and social-level phenomena, whatever these phenomena may be” 
(p. 76). Agent-based modelling is defined here in reductionist terms: because only agents 
and their local interactions are modelled, higher level patterns must just be epiphenomenal. 
 
 
IV. The ontological sense of emergence 
 
Individualist emergentism leads to understanding emergent properties as epiphenomenal 
(without causal power) because only individuals’ actions create those properties; this is the 
main difference from those who assert that social properties are not deducible from the 
isolated individual. Although both perspectives affirm that only individuals exist, there are 
important differences in the epistemological and ontological status that each gives to the 
concept of emergence. On the one hand, for some sociologists, the most reasonable 
hypothesis is that patterns and characteristics of individual action generate the social 
regularities that we observe. This position is identified with reductionism. On the other 
hand, many accounts in sociology use the notion of emergence to argue that collective 
phenomena are realities in their own right; although brought about by individuals, they are 
not reducible to individual actions. This position is close to dualism.  
 
 This classical debate has affected modern trends in social research. As Gilbert 
argues  
 
A rather sterile debate between these two camps continued for much of the 1970s and 
1980s. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now possible to argue that while there was 
some truth in both, neither was a particularly helpful or revealing way of conceiving 
the relationship between macro and micro behaviour. It is the case, however, the most, 
if not all, current simulation of human societies essentially adopt one or other of these 
positions, often without making this explicit. (Gilbert, 1996, p. 3) 
 
 Individualists argues that “the most reasonable ontological hypothesis we can 
formulate in order to make sense of the social world as we know it is that it is individuals in 
interaction with others that generate the social regularities we observe” (Hedström, 2005, p. 
                                                                                                                                                     
not include its rules for interacting with others bees? (…) [T]he bee’s interaction rules are what make it a bee 
–and not a lump. When (as a designer of agent object) you get these rules right –when you get “the individual 
bee” right– you get the hive, too.” (Epstein, 2007, p. 37). 
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19). But this ‘ontological individualism’ does not imply the inevitability of ‘methodological 
individualism’. The logical error of making ontological arguments when supporting 
methodological claims is quite common in the philosophy of the social sciences. As Sawyer 
(2002) notes, the fact that social properties are nothing more than their individual 
supervening base does not entail that an explanation must be provided in the language used 
to describe individuals. Moreover, consistent with epistemological empiricism, micro-
sociology asserts that valid sociological explanations cannot be structural, but must always 
refer to situational micro-dynamics such as actors’ desires, beliefs or opportunities, because 
only individuals, not structures, are endowed with causal power. However, we could just as 
plausibly say that because the notion of ‘individuality’ is a theoretical – and by no means 
well clarified – abstraction, individuals do not ‘act’ in any more realistic or empirical sense 
than do structures. As Fuchs (1989, p. 178) wonders, “[c]ausal explanations are attempts at 
making sense, making sense requires languages appropriate for particular analytical 
purposes, but why should there be only one language (that of microsociology) into which 
all our accounts must be translated to make them ‘more empirical’ and ‘causally 
stronger’?”. 
 
 Those who believe in the causal power of emergent properties fail in a similar way. 
Most affirm the ontological status of emergent properties by referring to the non-linearity 
of the equations ruling elementary processes. The key point is that the complex behaviour 
of non-linear systems cannot be predicted from the initial state of the components, 
experimentally measured with limited accuracy. This is taken by some to mean that there is 
really more in the global behaviour than in the individual processes. But, if we want to 
prove the real existence of emergent properties, endowed with causal power, we cannot be 
satisfied with showing that complex systems are unpredictable in practice because of 
restricted knowledge of the initial conditions and the underlying deterministic laws. This 
only yields epistemological emergence, not ontological emergence (Bitbol, 2007; Schröder, 
1998). Moreover, the very concept of ‘downward causation’ seems to take for granted the 
definition of ‘causation’ and what thing is ‘caused’ (where to cause could be to restrain, to 
structure, to determine, to govern, or to delimit future events). The underlying problem is 
that nobody really knows what is meant by ‘causation’ or ‘cause’ or ‘causing’ (Hulswit, 
2005). For this reason Kim argues that “[e]mergentism cannot live without downward 
causation but it cannot live with it either. Downward causation is the raison d’être of 
emergence, but it may well turn out to be what in the end undermines it” (Kim, 2006, p. 
548). 
 
 
V. Non-ontological emergence 
 
Therefore, we have one concept and at the same time, one dilemma. The main question is 
whether we can both construct a non-ontological sense of emergent properties and establish 
its epistemological status for sociological research. The concept of medium downward 
causation, as proposed by Emmeche et al. (2000), although still heavily ontological, might 
be a good first step in order to answer that question. They define medium downward 
causation as follows: “an entity on a higher level comes into being through a realization of 
one amongst several possible states on the lower level – with the previous states of the 
higher level as the factor of selection.” (Emmeche et al., 2000, p. 24). Here, the emergent 
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properties are understood in terms of constraining conditions and micro-macro 
relationships. They maintain that “higher level entities are constraining conditions for the 
emergent activity of lower levels” (Emmeche et al., 2000, p. 25; italics in original). Higher 
properties restrict the multiple possibilities that lower properties can describe, and by doing 
so, also constrain which higher level phenomena will result from that given lower level. In 
their scheme, downward (and upward) causation is the co-limitation of possibilities (or 
possible states) over time.  
 
 The problem is whether, with this ‘medium’ framework, we can maintain that 
emergent properties can constitute their own substance. The ontological claim that a higher 
entity “is a real substantial phenomenon in its own right” (Emmeche et al., 2000, p. 23) 
becomes ambiguous because medium downward causation entails a shift from a description 
in terms of substances to a descriptions in terms of interactions. Is it possible to keep the 
scheme of Emmeche et al. without their ontological claim about emergent properties? 
 
 Some philosophers of science have addressed this issue. For instance, Bitbol’s re-
construction of emergent properties presupposes a thorough criticism of ontological claims 
at every single level of knowledge (that is, both micro and macro levels) as we have seen 
above. His position is based upon the logic inherent to quantum mechanics, claiming that 
quantum laws do not express the nature of physical reality, but only the limits of 
experimental information. Bitbol (2007) argues that in an experimental situation with some 
entangled physical system, the empirical information that we obtain is only specific 
determinations of our understanding under those experimental conditions. Hence, both 
micro and macro levels are the byproduct of an instrumental intervention; both properties at 
the micro level and the macro properties are the result of our acts of observation. As Bitbol 
(2007, p. 302) concludes, “[t]he ‘never ending tower’ of autonomous domains in Quantum 
Field Theory indeed concerns domains of study, domains of concepts, but not domains of 
being”. For this reason neither the concept of ontological emergence nor the idea of micro 
level properties can be sustained. The objection against non-reductive emergence and 
downward causation is defused by such a symmetrical construal of micro and macro 
properties, because what appears, and also what is acted upon, is relative to the instrument 
one uses.  
 
 This epistemological claim is not only restricted to research in quantum field theory 
and experimental physics. Spencer-Brown’s calculus does not talk about experimental 
instruments or devices but begins with the basic operation of drawing a distinction 
(Spencer-Brown, 1994). The Maturana and Varela’s biology of knowledge uses this 
operation and maintains that “[t]he act of indicating any being, object, thing, or unity 
involves making an act of distinction which distinguishes what has been indicated as 
separate from its background. Each time we refer to anything explicitly or implicitly, we 
are specifying a criterion of distinction, which indicates what we are talking about and 
specifies its properties as being, unity, or object” (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 40). This is 
an unavoidable situation for all observation, including the scientific one. A unity (entity, 
object) is therefore brought forth by an act of distinction.  
 
 However, have we got any analytical criteria to distinguish emergent properties in a 
non-ontological way? Again, it is Bitbol who provides a framework to distinguish upward 
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and downward dynamics without any causal power. Instead of giving analytical support to 
the causal nature of emergence by referring to some Aristotelian notion of cause, and the 
consequent strong claim that there exists causal power in property A to produce property B, 
Bitbol develops a co-emergent understanding of micro and macro properties in probabilistic 
terms. According to this framework, configuration A is the cause of the distinct 
configuration B if (i) whenever A has been actively set up, B occurs with a probability p; 
and (ii) whenever A has been actively removed, B does not occur3. Bitbol argues, with this 
definition we can speak of ‘downward causation’ in the following circumstances: if (i) 
whenever a high-level antecedent has been actively set up by means of a high-level coarse-
grained device, a certain group of low-level phenomena, relative to a certain type of fine-
grained experimental device, occurs with probability p; (ii) whenever the former high-level 
antecedent has been actively prevented, the former group of low-level phenomena is not 
observed. Because this procedure can easily been turned upside down, downward causation 
is the symmetric mirror image of upward causation (Bitbol, 2007, p. 305).  
 
 In this non-ontological framework, the issue of downward causation is not one of 
inherent powers, but one of actions and relations: actions which bring about the world 
(with its levels and properties), because the world comes into being as a direct result of our 
distinctions; and relations between micro and macro levels, in terms of limitation of 
possibilities, because when the higher level is set up, some low-level phenomena are likely 
to occur. 
 
 The notion of emergence is not all there is to ‘mysticism’, although, as Epstein 
states, it is sometimes treated as it were. Emergence might not be the central concept in 
computational modelling. But it is an interesting and important concept to comprehend 
social processes; it has a significant heuristic and interpretative value within social research 
in general and computational sociology in particular. However, as we showed in Section 
III, it is still not as well understood as it should be, considering the amount of serious 
scholarship devoted to it during the last decade or two4. For this reason, the non-ontological 
framework presented above can help to computational modellers to distinguish, identify 
and define emergent processes, either in social realm or in their computational simulations. 
In both cases, we are witnessing an emergent process if and only if we can analytically 
apply the ‘medium concept of emergence’ (as increasing co-limitation of possibilities) and 
the two conditions of causality as stated by Bitbol. The computational modeller can, strictly 
speaking, only identify her or his simulation as describing some emergent feature when 
these conditions are satisfied. 
 
                                                 
3
 Both conditions are necessary, because each of them serves to exclude, as Bitbol argues, a certain type of 
parasitic effect: “Condition (ii) is obviously indispensible, because if after having prevented A, B does not 
occur, this excludes that the frequent association of A and B was purely fortuitous. But condition (i) is also 
necessary, because if actively producing A by any means is enough to trigger the appearance of B (with 
probability p), this excludes that the observed association of A and B was due to some common cause. 
Condition (ii) is usually not sufficient for this latter purpose since there are situations where preventing A can 
only be done at the cost of preventing the common cause of A and B to occur”. (Bitbol, 2007, pp. 15-16) 
4
 A quick survey by Google Scholar shows that there are 5,430 hits for ‘social simulation’. If we add to this 
searching the keyword ‘emergence’ there are 2,170 hits (40%). Searching for the word “emergence” in the 
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, we find 495 occurrences.  
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 There are many examples of social simulation where this logical framework can be 
used. One classic example is Schelling’s (1971) model of residential segregation. In this 
model, made to demonstrate the unintended consequences of household migration, 
individual decisions about whether to move from a current location, given a certain 
threshold of tolerance, depend on the local levels of segregation, which, in turn, individual 
decisions tend to reinforce. The process finishes when a state of static equilibrium is 
reached, in which all individuals ‘decide’ to stay in their locations, grouped in clusters of 
similar individuals. Then a high level of segregation is apparent. However, it is not so 
obvious that the original Schelling model describes a limitation of possibilities (because the 
possibilities of individual’s elections are just two, and always one of those two decisions 
must be taken). But an extension of this model presented by Gilbert (2002) with explicit 
‘downward causation’ also showed segregation. In this case, some individual 
configurations (a simple set of rules and a level of tolerance within certain range of values) 
brought about clusters of similar individuals resulting in a limitation of possibilities of 
movement for some individuals. This process reinforces the segregation pattern. It is the 
individuals’ configuration (not the individuals) that causes the macro behaviour, because 
with a different configuration (e.g., a threshold of tolerance lower than 30%) the 
segregation is not observed. The inverse relationship is true as well, because without the 
macro behaviour of segregation the possibilities of movement throughout the space would 
be higher for each individual. 
 
 Models about the evolution of lexicons are another example of simulations 
describing emergent features (Steels & Kaplan, 2002; Steels, 2003). In these simulations, 
agents are capable of bootstrapping their own ontology and shared lexicon without prior 
design or other forms of human intervention. An interesting phenomenon studied by these 
simulations is the process of ‘damping synonymy and ambiguity’ that arises as an emergent 
property in the lexicon. This damping is expected because the agents get explicit feedback 
about the co-occurrence of a referent-category and there is lateral inhibition as well as a 
positive feedback loop between previous uses and success. Thus, different agents engaged 
in a ‘game’ (which involves repeated dialogues in which a score measuring the associations 
between referents and categories are constantly updated) are more likely to select some 
categories (from a broader set of available categories) for expressing a specific referent, 
which, in turn, damp general synonymy, reinforcing the limitation of possibilities that 
agents have. This emergent process yields one category that comes to dominate the 
expression of one specific referent. Again, the micro-specifications (that the modeller 
implements) result in macro-behaviours that are supposed to reveal, in this case, the 
emergence of language. 
 
 The above examples show that modellers, facing up to some ‘real world’ 
phenomenon, do not need to make any supposition about the essence or the intrinsic nature 
of the two levels (Schelling was not interested in why people decide to move out; linguists 
do not have fossils to help them understand how language could have emerged). It is 
enough to know how to act selectively at one of the two levels in order to modify what is 
observed at the other level. As Bitbol says, “[i]t is no longer a question of own-being, but 
only of endless processes of which we partake by our actions” (Bitbol, 2007, p. 305).  
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 Therefore, by overcoming the epistemological drawbacks inherent in the ontological 
sense of emergence we are able to distinguish emergent social order from individuals and 
the dynamic interaction of upward and downward causation as Emmeche et al. do5. The 
social researcher’s observation is, simultaneously, the distinction between individual and 
society and the consequent mutual dependence (co-dependency or perhaps co-production?) 
that emerges in the very observation. The distinction between individual and society (or 
micro and macro properties) is then linked to the domain that is distinguished by one 
observer. As Gilbert argues,  
 
Emergent phenomena are ones where there is an observation mechanism for the 
emergent phenomenon that does not apply to structures at the lower level. (…) It is 
important to note that the definition of emergence involves an external “observation 
mechanism” (…) Different mechanism can yield different observations and so different 
conclusions about emergence. This implies that emergence and indeed the separation of 
structures into levels is a matter of scientific convention: there is a sense in which it is 
true to say that emergence is in the eye of the beholder. (Gilbert, 2006, p. 429) 
 
 The main issue is whether we as sociological observers are able to distinguish the 
social unity as different from the individual. In the following section, we introduce a 
sociological alternative to the individualistic and holistic interpretations of social 
phenomena. This alternative is based on the structural coupling of individual consciousness 
and social communication as advanced by the theory of self-referential social systems. In 
that perspective, communication is understood as an emergent order that exerts structural 
limitations on the possibilities of individual selections and where different kinds of 
emergent properties bring about different properties at the lower level.  
 
 
VI. Social communication and social emergence 
 
As Luhmann (1990, p. 6) says, “[c]onfronted with the question of elementary units, most 
sociologists would come up with the answer: action. Sometimes ‘roles’ or even human 
individuals are preferred”. These traditional options overlook both the importance of 
communication in social research and its relation with the concept of emergence and 
perhaps for this reason symbolic communication has been studied mainly by linguistics, not 
by sociologists (Gostoli, 2008; Perfors, 2002; Steels, 2003; Werner & Dyer, 1992). Sawyer 
has described the issue in the following terms: 
 
A theory of social emergence requires an explicit theorization of symbolic 
communication and dynamic processes. Yet for the most part, sociological theorists who 
focus on the micro-macro link have not theorized communication, nor the role that 
communication plays in micro-macro relations. (Sawyer, 2005, p. 187)  
 
 The basic assertion is that the emergence of language is the emergence of society. 
But Sawyer goes one step further and relates symbolic interaction with computational 
                                                 
5
 Another important consequence of this framework for social theory in general and computational sociology 
in particular is related to the following question: if reality is brought about by observation, then what is the 
truth of the simulation? (Schmid, 2005). A related problem is the most effective procedure for verification and 
validation of computational models. However, these problems are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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sociology. By analyzing three broad classes of artificial societies, namely reactive, 
cognitive and collaborative agent societies, Sawyer suggests that differences in 
communication result in different emergent processes and outcomes. Emergence occurs 
only when there is an interaction among agents, but, what is more important, “different 
collective properties emerge and the processes of their emergence are different when the 
agent communication language is changed” (Sawyer, 2005, p. 188). Thus, Sawyer 
concludes that (i) the model of communication that is used in an artificial society has causal 
consequences for the type of emergent regularities under study and (ii) a theory of symbolic 
communication (that is, language) must be a core component in any explanation of social 
phenomena.  
 
 Nevertheless, Sawyer’s theory of social emergence, which is based both on 
collaborative activities among agents and the distinction between ephemeral and stable 
emergence, is insufficient to explain the evolutionary stabilisation of social structures and 
the emergence of generalised symbolic media such as money and power. In some current 
trends in both social theory in general and computational sociology in particular, language 
is taken to be the basic element of society. However, language is not enough to stabilise 
complex social orders over time because language gives no motivation for co-ordinated 
selection among individuals. As Mascareño (2008, p. 4) argues, language “can limit 
selection possibilities but motivation itself derives from the structured expectations of 
meaningful constellations allowed by the evolution of symbolically generalized 
communication media”. The mistake is to deposit into language more than language can 
actually hold. We need to use another theory about the emergence and evolution of social 
communication.  
 
 In the Parsonian tradition, ego and alter are each objects of orientation for the other. 
Every social interaction constitutes a situation of double contingency, that is, both ego and 
alter know that both know that one could also act differently (Vanderstraeten, 2002). The 
concept of double contingency implies that ego’s gratifications are contingent on alter’s 
selection of action and, in turn, alter’s reaction will be contingent on ego’s selection that 
will result from a complementary selection on alter’s part and so on (Parsons, Shils, & 
Smelser, 2001). And for both alter and ego there are unlimited possible selections. 
Luhmann follows this conceptualisation and agrees with Parsons that social order is 
impossible unless the problem of double contingency is solved. In Luhmann’s words: “We 
would emphasize that the problem of double contingency belongs to the conditions of 
possibility for action and that therefore the elements of action systems, namely, actions, can 
be constituted only in these systems and only by solving the problem of double 
contingency.” (Luhmann, 1996a, p. 104). Luhmann explains the connection with the 
emergence of social order in the following terms: 
 
The basic situation of double contingency is then simple: two black boxes, whatever 
accident, come to have dealings with one another. (…) For the few aspects through which 
they deal with one another, their capacity for processing information can suffice. They 
remain separate; they do not merge (…) They concentrate on what they can observe as 
input and output in the other as a system in an environment (…) They can try to influence 
what they observe by their own action and can learn further from the feedback. In this 
way, an emergent order can arise that is conditioned by the complexity of the systems 
that make possible but that does not depend on this complexity’s being calculated or 
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controlled. We call this emergent order a social system. (Luhmann, 1996a, p. 110; italics 
in original) 
 
 However, Luhmann rejects the idea that this problem can be taken care of by 
reference to the concept of culture, as Parsons and many other sociologists believe. Culture 
appeals to norms and values to explain motivation and selection, but nobody elucidates 
how norms and values become stabilised and how they change (Luhmann, 1999a). 
Moreover, explaining social order using the concepts of culture, norms or values forces us 
to think (tautologically) that society was already grown before it grew itself. For this 
reason, culture is an insufficient concept to explain social phenomena. 
 
 To summarize, to overcome the problem of double contingency is to produce an 
emergent order, independent of both alter and ego; that is, independent of individuals. But, 
if social theory cannot explain the stability of social order on the basis of norms, values or 
consensus, what is to take their place? Because double contingency is a pre-eminent social 
problem, the solution requires the use of a pre-eminent social operation; namely 
communication. Social order can only be produced by means of communication, although it 
is this order that also enables communication (Vanderstraeten, 2002). This is a really 
counterintuitive proposition. A common-sense perspective would maintain not only that 
communication must necessarily be between individuals, but also that only individuals are 
able to communicate. Contrary to this view, Luhmann argues that, fundamentally speaking, 
individuals cannot communicate at all, not even in their capacity as psychic systems. In 
Luhmann’s theory, individuals (or psychic systems) operate in terms of meaning in the 
form of a closed connection of consciousness. Similarly, social systems operate in terms of 
meaning in the form of a closed connection of communication. Therefore, the strong axiom 
of the theory is: communication alone is able to communicate (Andersen, 2003; Luhmann, 
2007). Society is self-referential or autopoietic from this perspective, because it is 
understood as an independent and emergent phenomenon (that is, communication) that 
cannot be reduced to something other than itself, for instance, neither to consciousness nor 
to a sum of actions or individuals. Here we see the phenomenological insistence on 
observing society as it appears without reference to conditions external to society. And 
individuals, as psychic systems, are external to society. 
 
 But, what is communication? As Mascareño argues (2008), communication is a 
shared actualisation of meaning achieved through the evolution of social systems. This 
allows reciprocal co-ordination of expectations among participants. Only an evolutionary 
system-building process can select meaning variations and stabilise them into structures of 
expectations (or social systems).  
 
 Communication is an emergent order, a state sui generis. It emerges through a 
synthesis of three selections, namely: alter selects information from a horizon of 
meaningful possibilities; she or he instantiates it through language or actions (utterances); 
ego observes alter’s conduct and understands or misunderstands this utterance and its 
information (Luhmann, 1990). Of course, ego can accept or reject the offer, but anyway it 
might be said that ego understands alter’s proposal. “[T]he acceptance or rejection of an 
expected and understood selection are not part of the communicative event; they are 
connected acts (…) Viewed dynamically, the unity of an individual communication is 
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merely its connectivity” (Luhmann, 1996a, p. 148). Both acceptance and rejection are 
equally probable. “[U]nderstanding always includes misunderstanding, and if one does not 
add on presuppositions, the component of misunderstanding becomes so great that the 
continuation of communication becomes improbable” (Luhmann, 1996a, p. 158). Thus, the 
theory Luhmann is trying to formulate starts from the premise that it is implausible. And 
because the basic element of society is communication (and not individuals), social order 
also appears as a highly improbable event. 
 
This improbability of which we have become unaware must first be understood, and to do 
so requires what might be described as a contra-phenomenological effort, viewing 
communication not as a phenomenon but as a problem; thus, instead of looking for the 
most appropriate concept to cover the facts, we must first ask how communication is 
possible at all. (Luhmann, 1990, p. 87) 
 
 Luhmann (1990) argues that communication – if it comes about – must overcome 
three obstacles or improbabilities: (a) the individuality of human consciousness, (b) the 
extension of communication beyond direct participants and (c) the improbability of success. 
The first improbability is related with understanding; given that their bodies and minds are 
separate and individual, it is unlikely that one person can understand what another person 
means. Meaning can be understood only in context, and for each individual consists 
primarily of what his own memory supplies. Furthermore, as we said above, understanding 
always includes misunderstanding. The second improbability is related with the spatial and 
temporary limitations of communication in reaching recipients. That is, it is improbable that 
a communication can get to more people than are present in a given situation. Even if the 
communication finds a means of conveyance that is constant over time, it is still unlikely 
that it might attract attention: in other situations people have other things to do. The third 
improbability is that the communication, even if it is understood, is accepted and followed. 
By success Luhmann means “that the recipient of the communication accepts the selective 
content of the communication (the information) as a premise of his own behaviour, thus 
joining further selections to the primary selection and reinforcing its selectivity in the 
processes” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 88). Communicative success is the successful coupling of 
selections between alter and ego. Regarding all these three improbabilities, Luhmann 
argues: 
 
(…) no social system can be formed without communication. One must expect entropy, 
even if the opposite is the case. This does not contradict the theorem of improbability; it 
indicates more precisely where the problems lie whose solutions enable communication 
in the course of evolution, get system formation going, and transform improbabilities into 
probabilities. The immanent improbabilities of the communicative process and the way in 
which they are overcome and transformed into probabilities regulate the construction of 
social systems. (Luhmann, 1996a, p. 159) 
 
 However, despite these improbabilities, social order exists and we communicate 
daily. This is because social evolution has solved these improbabilities with three 
consequent agencies (or mechanisms), which Luhmann identifies with the concept of 
media. The first evolutionary achievement, to overcome the first improbability mentioned 
above, is language. Language is a medium which, via acoustical and optical signs, makes it 
more probable that ego understands alter. It can, through the use of equivalent signs, 
reinforce the impression that ego and alter hold equivalent opinions (Luhmann, 1990). 
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Linguistic statements produce so specific sounds, articulated in so improbable and 
recognizable ways that it is very difficult for ego to deny that the statement has a 
communicative intention. Thus, ego can observe that this ‘sound’ or ‘action’ uttered by 
alter has an underlying informative value, which ego will reconstruct and attribute. But 
language per se is still strongly coupled with interactional contexts. Dissemination media, 
such as writing, printing and electronic broadcasting, contribute to expanding 
communication themes beyond the restrictive boundaries of interaction systems. These 
media immensely increase the scope of communication and result in a social order 
decoupled from local contexts and from idiosyncratic interpretations. But both language 
and dissemination media make it even more doubtful which communications will succeed. 
 
 Language and dissemination media are preconditions to other media that make 
success probable, namely, symbolically generalised communication media. Only the later 
media achieve the ultimate aim of communication: to motivate heterogeneous individuals 
to act and experience in a relatively coordinated way (Mascareño, 2008). They make 
possible, at the individual level, what Luhmann calls “the nexus between selection and 
motivation” (Luhmann, 1996a, p. 161). And at the macro level, they make possible the 
emergence of meaningful constellations of co-ordinated selectivity which provide common 
significance, identifiable themes and complementary expectations. Motivation is implied in 
the selection of symbolic media as they generate their own conditions of acceptability and 
diffusion. Thus, the multiple possibilities of selection that individuals have can be 
restricted, making social order more likely. The complexity of the social realm emerges 
through the reduction of these multiple possibilities and through the selective conditioning 
of this reduction. Symbolically generalised communication media achieve this by defining 
the limits of what is structurally possible in each case, that is, in each social constellation of 
meaning (or social system). Luhmann analysed multiple examples of such media: scientific 
truth within the scientific system (Luhmann, 1994a), power within politics (Luhmann, 
1990, 1994b), validity within the law (Luhmann, 1990, 1995, 2004), love within intimacy 
(Luhmann, 1999b) and beauty within art (Luhmann, 1990, 1996b, 2000). 
 
 The social dynamic or micro-macro link thus produced can be explained in the 
following terms (Mascareño 2008): In an upward direction, the process of mutual 
references from one individual (alter) to another (ego) continuously recreates the social 
order as stabilised constellations of meaning. Conversely, in a downward direction, these 
relatively stabilised structures of communication exert a conditioning effect on the 
progression of communicative events, which can be seen as a downward causation process 
expanding from the social, down to the psychic system. Alter’s and ego’s experiences and 
actions are modulated and coupled with stabilised expectations in social evolution. The 
structural couple between individual (psychic systems) and society (communication 
systems) does not mean that individual selections are determined because this would break 
the operational closure of both individual and society. Rather, symbolic media only 
“motivates to follow the orientation given by stabilised systemic structures. Otherwise 
individuals would lose their acceptance capability for selections, even though their 
counterfactual behaviour can trigger variations in the constellations of meaning that move 
society in unpredictable and contingent directions.” (Mascareño, 2008, p. 6). 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have considered some epistemological drawbacks to the concept of 
emergence (and the related dynamics of upward and downward causation) and some 
consequences of these drawbacks for computational sociology. Many of them are based 
upon the heavily ontological definition of emergent properties, which tend to split the social 
simulation community between those holding to an individualistic approach and those 
affirming a holistic one. In order to overcome these drawbacks, we have discussed some 
current trends in the philosophy of science, in which the concept of emergence is 
reconstructed, from a non-ontological position, with an understanding of causation in terms 
of constraining conditions and individual-society relationships. We have argued that 
Luhmann’s theory of self-referential social system is consistent with such a non-ontological 
position on emergence and can deliver new insights and give analytical support to the 
computer simulation of social phenomena. His theory understands social communication as 
an emergent phenomenon that makes possible the restriction of the unlimited possibilities 
of selection that individuals have (double contingency).  
 
 We have paid attention to symbolically generalised communication media. These 
media are meaningful constellations of common significance, identifiable themes and 
complementary expectations. We described those constellations as structures of 
expectations that alter and ego use to reduce the uncertainty of their own double 
contingency; with only those media can individuals accept the selective content of the 
communication as a premise of their own behaviour. Symbolic media promote some 
selections and exclude others depending on the context of their instantiation: they motivate 
awareness of the other in intimate relations (love); payment operations in economic 
transactions (money); evaluation of the electoral consequences of political decisions 
(power); and the validity of arguments in science (scientific truth). Conversely, consumers 
generally do not buy in the supermarket using love; politicians who make decisions because 
they have been paid are considered to be corrupt; and even the Prime Minister must prove 
the validity of his arguments if he wants to submit a paper to the British Journal of 
Sociology. Therefore, different meaningful constellations bring about different expected 
selections. 
 
 The logic inherent in each constellation (or social system) has been developed by 
Luhmann in several works. His theoretical framework can be very useful to computational 
sociology, in order to make models theoretically informed. The interest in this analytical 
framework has been growing among the social simulation community. A good example is 
Fleischmann’s computational model of a simple Luhmann economy (Fleischmann, 2005). 
Using an agent-based model, the author reproduces the evolutionary dynamic of the 
economy. For Luhmann, the circulation of the economy is made possible at the historical 
moment when economic institutions circumvent successfully the paradox of scarcity, 
according to which the richer supply of one is the greater need of the other (more 
abstractly, every access to scarce goods which serves the lessening of scarcity increases 
scarcity). Fleischmann’s agent-based model showed conformity to Luhmann’s hypothesis: 
giving specific initial conditions, the economy produces unevenness from unevenness. 
Others authors have worked on the relation between expectations and meaning (e.g. 
Leydesdorff, 2005; Duong & Grefenstette, 2005). However, Luhmann’s premises still pose 
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some challenges to computational social science. For example, the theory of media can be 
considered, in Lakatos’s terms, as a ‘research programme’ in its own right (Chernilo, 
2002), because it explains the historical processes by which the constellations of co-
ordinated selectivity become differentiated (therefore, this theory has empirical content and 
some of this content has been verified). However, there are no computational models of 
these evolutionary processes. This is a major topic for computational sociology, because it 
is accustomed to deal with the dynamic stabilization of social structures. At this stage we 
just can ask: Is computational sociology capable of undertaking the challenges that 
Luhmann’s social theory generates? 
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